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Voting Rights Act Section 2: Racially Polarized Voting and the 
Minority Community's Representative of Choice 
Not a single Southern legislature stood ready to admit a Negro, 
under any conditions, to the polls; ... there was scarcely a white man in 
the South who did not honestly regard Emancipation as a crime, and its 
practical nullification as a duty. In such a situation, the granting of the 
ballot to the black man was a necessity, the very least a guilty nation 
could grant a wronged race .... 
- W.E.B. DuBois1 
A much needed congressional effort to give substance to African-
American suffrage resulted in the enactment of the Voting Rights Act 
of 19652 (the Act). Although the fifteenth amendment gave African-
American men the right to vote in 1870,3 almost a hundred years later 
they were still largely unable to exercise the right.4 This condition did 
not result from apathy on the part of African-American voters, but 
rather from their inability to overcome barriers set up by white racists. 
Practices whites instituted, such as "[l]iteracy and 'understanding' 
tests, poll taxes, the white primary, intimidation, [and] violence," pre-
vented African-Americans from realizing their constitutional right to 
vote.5 
The following facts illustrate the efficacy of these techniques. In 
1965, when Congress responded to denial of voting rights, only 383 
African-Americans of voting age, out of approximately 15,000, were 
registered to vote in Dallas County, Alabama.6 In the three months 
following the enactment of the Voting Rights Act, 8000 African-
Americans registered.7 Under such conditions, assuring African-
Americans access to the ballot alone marked a congressional 
achievement. 
By 1980, even in the South, at the heart of the problem, African-
American registration had reached approximately 60%, on a par with 
the registration level of whites. 8 Thus, in revising section 2 of the Act 
1. W.E.B. DuBOIS, THE SOULS OF BLACK FOLK 76 (1903) (Signet Classic ed. 1969). 
2. Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 437 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971-1974e (1988)). 
3. African-American women, along with white women, received the right to vote from the 
nineteenth amendment in 1920. 
4. 128 CONG. REc. 13,171 (June 9, 1982)(statement of Sen. Kennedy); see A. THERNSTROM, 
WHOSE VOTES COUNT? AmRMATIVE ACTION AND MINORITY VOTING RIGHTS 1-2 (1987) 
(The Act "enfranchised the southern black, thereby fulfilling the promise of the Fifteenth 
Amendment ninety-five years late."). 
5. A. THERNSTROM, supra note 4, at 2. 
6. Id. at 17-18. 
7. Id. 
8. Williams, Blacks, the Changing Political Climate, and Redistricting, in REDISTRICTING IN 
THE 1990s: A GUIDE FOR MINORITY GROUPS 21, 27 (W. O'Hare ed. 1989). 
1038 
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in response to Supreme Court action,9 Congress could refocus on pro-
tecting all that the right to vote encompasses, a great deal more than 
the mere ballot. As amended, section 2 requires that minority 
groups10 be afforded equal opportunity "to participate in the political 
process and to elect representatives of their choice."11 Lower courts 
struggled to determine the meaning of this phrase for four years. The 
Supreme Court finally spoke on the issue in Thornburg v. Gingles. 12 
Besides creating a test and standards in this decision, the Court cre-
ated a controversy: in a section 2 "vote dilution" case, how does one 
determine who the minority community's candidate of choice is? 
Plaintiff minority voters bring vote dilution claims under section 2 
by alleging that a districting scheme has prevented their votes from 
having full value. For example, an "at-large districting scheme" exists 
if a city, 60% white and 40% minority, has a city council made up of 
five members, and all voters vote for five members. Such a scheme 
does not violate section 2 per se, even though if all 60% of the white 
voters vote together consistently against candidates supported by all 
40% of the minority voters, the minority group could never numeri-
cally elect a single representative to the council. If, however, the mi-
nority group shows that the city could be divided into five districts, 
one or two of which would consist primarily of minority voters, then 
the group proves a prima facie violation of section 2. The at-large 
scheme in this hypothetical dilutes the minority votes. A scheme of 
five single-member districts would allow the minority group to elect 
one, or even two, representatives, whereas under the at-large scheme 
they can elect none. 
The controversy created in Gingles centers on the minority group's 
most difficult step - proving that white voters consistently vote as a 
bloc against a minority group's representative.13 This proof is neces-
sary, according to the Gingles Court, to show that the minority group 
is unable to elect their chosen representative.14 Here, the question be-
comes: of what significance is the race of the candidates in deciding 
which elections should be considered when courts must evaluate a sec-
tion 2 vote dilution claim? More specifically, courts must ask whether 
9. See, e.g., City of Mobile v. Bolden, 446 U.S. 55 (1980) (holding that vote dilution plaintiffs 
must prove discriminatory intent); see also infra section II.A. 
10. Section 2 protects not only African-Americans, but all citizens, including, for example, 
Latinos and Asian-Americans, from state practices which result in abridgment of their right to 
vote "on account of race or color." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(a) (1988). In this Note, the term "minor-
ity" sometimes describes a particular group, and other times describes all groups covered by the 
statute. It will be clear from the context when the term only describes one group. 
11. 42 u.s.c. § 1973(b) (1988). 
12. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
13. See section I.A for a discussion of "racial bloc voting" in the context of vote dilution 
claims. 
14. 478 U.S. at 51. 
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all elections held under the challenged election scheme did, in fact, 
include a minority group representative. 
This Note attempts to identify the sources of this conflict and pro-
poses an approach to answering questions posed above. Part I ana-
lyzes the case law, beginning with the first Supreme Court 
interpretation of section 2 and then examining the three general ways 
the lower courts have responded. Part II explores the legislative his-
tory of the amendment to section 2 in order to uncover congressional 
intent. Part III then proposes a solution based on congressional intent 
and a theory of civic inclusion for minorities. Finally, Part III con-
cludes by testing the proposed solution against the concerns which 
originally created the debate and shows that the solution meets the 
concerns voiced on both sides of the issue. 
I. THE COURTS' TREATMENT OF A.MENDED SECTION 2 
This Part describes judicial interpretation of section 2. The first 
section analyzes Thornburg v. Gingles, currently the only Supreme 
Court guidance on amended section 2. It discusses the opposing posi-
tions of Justices Brennan and White on the issue of "racially polarized 
voting" - the condition which exists when white voters vote consist-
ently for different candidates from those for whom minority group 
voters vote. Congress suggested in the legislative history of section 2 
that racially polarized voting should be one factor considered by 
courts in determining whether the Act has been violated. 15 Congress 
intended that a showing of racially polarized voting be some evidence 
that a "practice or structure ... [impairs a minority group's right to] 
an equal opportunity to participate in the political processes and to 
elect candidates of their choice .... " 16 Left to their own devices, 
lower courts have loosely formed three different approaches to the 
problem, a problem which so sharply divided the Justices that only a 
plurality was formed. The second section of the Part considers each of 
the three approaches in turn, and concludes by identifying the con-
cerns which fuel the debate over the significance of a candidate's race 
in determining whether racially polarized voting exists. 
A. Supreme Court Guidance - Thornburg v. Gingles 
In 1986, the Supreme Court handed down Thornburg v. Gingles, 11 
15. S. REP. No. 417, 97th Cong., 2d Sess. 29 [hereinafter SENATE REPORT], reprinted in 
1982 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADM!N. NEWS 177, 206. 
16. Id. at 28, reprinted at 206. 
17. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). The Gingles Court was only divided on the issue this Note addresses. 
Justice Brennan's opinion secured a majority of the Court, except section 111.C, in which Justices 
Marshall, Blackmun, and Stevens joined, and section IV.B, in which Justice White joined. Jus-
tice White wrote a short dissent to section 111.C, and Justice O'Connor wrote an opinion, joined 
by Justices Burger, Powell, and Rehnquist concurring in the judgment. 
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its only interpretation to date of section 2 of the Voting Rights Act as 
amended in 1982.18 The plaintiffs, African-American registered voters 
of North Carolina, proved at the district court level that a redistricting 
scheme for the state legislature resulted in the dilution of their votes, 
in violation of the Act. The state appealed directly to the Supreme 
Court, arguing in part that the district court had erred by using both 
an incorrect definition of racially polarized voting and a legally incor-
rect standard for determining whether the amount of racially po-
larized voting found in the case was sufficient to trigger section 2 
protection.19 
The Court formulated a three-prong test to determine whether or 
not plaintiffs have made a prima facie case that the dilution of their 
votes results from a multimember districting scheme. The test focused 
selectively on only one of the nine factors Congress suggested courts 
consider.20 
First, the minority group must be able to demonstrate that it is suffi-
ciently large and geographically compact to constitute a majority in a 
single member district .... Second, the minority group must be able to 
show that it is politically cohesive .... Third, the minority must be able 
to demonstrate that the white majority votes sufficiently as a bloc to en-
able it ... usually to defeat the minority's preferred candidate.21 
The first prong is not based on any of the factors suggested by Con-
gress, but was what Justice Brennan described as a logically necessary 
requirement.22 He argued that an at-large districting scheme could 
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988). Section 2, as codified and amended, reads: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, practice, or procedure 
shall be imposed or applied by any State or political subdivision in a manner which results in 
a denial or abridgment of the right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of 
race or color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 1973b(f)(2), as pro-
vided in subsection (b) of this section. 
(b) A violation of subsection (a) of this section is established if, based on the totality of 
circumstances, it is shown that the political processes leading to nomination or election in 
the State or political subdivision are not equally open to participation by members of a class 
of citizens protected by subsection (a) in that its members have less opportunity than other 
members of the electorate to participate in the political process and to elect representatives 
of their choice. The extent to which members of a protected class have been elected to office 
in the State or political subdivision is one circumstance which may be considered: Provided, 
That nothing in this section establishes a right to have members of a protected class elected 
in numbers equal to their proportion in the population. 
19. 478 U.S. at 42. 
20. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 28-29, reprinted at 206-07, for the list of nine 
factors; infra note 115 (same). The Senate Committee derived and explicitly listed nine factors, 
which it concluded were likely to be relevant in these cases, from the Supreme Court's findings in 
White v. Regester, 412 U.S. 755, 765-70 (1973). See SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 22, 
reprinted at 199. 
21. 478 U.S. at 50-51 (citations omitted). The Gingles test is applicable only to an "ability to 
elect" claim. The Court reserved judgment on the potential merit of an "ability to influence" 
claim, and on what test would apply to such a claim. 478 U.S. at 46 n.12; cf Karlan, Maps and 
Misreadings: The Role of Geographic Compactness in Racial Vote Dilution Litigation, 24 HARV. 
C.R.-C.L. L. R.Ev. 173, 201-02 (1989) (criticizing courts which have not recognized this 
distinction). 
22. 478 U.S. at 50. 
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not harm a plaintiff group if the injury would not be remedied by hav-
ing the area divided into single districts, at least one of which would 
have over 50% minority voters.23 Both the second and third prongs of 
the test turn on a determination of the existence of racially polarized 
voting, which was the second of Congress' factors.24 These two 
prongs are merely flip sides of racial bloc voting: proof that the minor-
ity group votes as a bloc and proof that the white voters consistently 
vote as a bloc against the candidate supported by the most minority 
votes. By proving the minority community usually votes differently 
from the white majority, the minority community demonstrates that it 
is politically cohesive, that it shares common concerns, and that "sub-
mergence in a white multimember district impedes its ability to elect 
its chosen representatives."25 Therefore, the second and third prongs 
of the Court's test make proving significant racial bloc voting26 crucial 
to the voters' case by requiring such proof for a minority group to 
establish even a prima facie case.21 
While a majority of the Court agreed upon the importance of racial 
bloc voting to a vote dilution case, only a plurality could agree upon 
what evidence a court should consider persuasive in finding the pres-
ence or absence of racially polarized voting. Justice Brennan, joined 
by three other Justices, argued that the basic inquiry under section 2 is 
whether minorities have an equal opportunity to elect representatives 
of their choice. "It is," he therefore maintained, "the difference be-
tween the choices made by blacks and whites - not the reasons for 
that difference -" which is important under section 2.28 Brennan 
urged that a showing of "a correlation" between race and different 
candidates' supporters should be enough to prove racial bloc voting.29 
He rejected the defendant's argument that the fact that white voters 
vote for different candidates than African-American voters is not 
enough to prove racial bloc voting; that, rather, there must be a racial 
motive behind the polarization. 3° For example, the defendant insisted 
that if whites in the relevant area do not vote for African-American 
candidates because of racial hostility toward those candidates, racially 
polarized voting is proved, whereas if the reason for their withholding 
23. 478 U.S. at 50 n.17. Contra Karlan, supra note 21, at 201-04. 
24. See infra note 115. 
25. 478 U.S. at 51. 
26. In this Note, as in the Gingles opinion, the terms "racially polarized voting" and "racial 
bloc voting" are used interchangeably. See 478 U.S. at 52 n.18. 
27. Abrams, ''Raising Politics Up": Minority Political Participation and Section 2 of the Vot-
ing Rights Act, 63 N.Y.U. L. R.Ev. 449, 494 n.231 (1988); see Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City 
of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 499 (5th Cir. 1987); City of Carrollton NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 
1547, 1550 (11th Cir. 1987). 
28. 478 U.S. at 63 (Brennan, J., plurality). 
29. 478 U.S. at 74 (Brennan, J., plurality) (emphasis added). 
30. 478 U.S. at 63, 74 (Brennan, J., plurality). 
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votes is those candidates' inexperience, racial bloc voting has not been 
proved. Brennan responded "that the race of the candidate per se is 
irrelevant to racial bloc voting analysis."31 
Brennan cited the language of section 2 as authority for his state-
ment, which protects minority voters, not minority candidates, guar-
anteeing the former the opportunity to "elect representatives of their 
choice."32 According to Brennan, a minority candidate will often be 
the choice of the minority voters. 33 The success or failure of a minor-
ity candidate's campaign, however, is of no relevance to an assessment 
of the degree of racial bloc voting in an area except insofar as the mi-
nority candidate is the preferred candidate of the minority voters. 34 
Thus, Brennan argued that the existence of racial bloc voting should 
be determined based on the facts of the case, in terms of how strong a 
correlation exists between the voters' race and the candidate they sup-
port, regardless of the candidate's race. That Brennan did not, how-
ever, intend to take away as much as his words indicate is illustrated 
in that, interestingly, when he evaluated the facts of Gingles, he con-
sidered only elections including a minority candidate. His purpose in 
deeming the candidate's race irrelevant was to protect plaintiffs from 
having to prove that white voters had discriminatory intent - which 
would foil Congress' purpose in establishing a results test. 35 
By contrast, Justice White, while concurring in the judgment, ar-
gued that party politics and interest group politics can, in certain in-
stances, produce electoral results that would look like racial bloc 
voting, as Justice Brennan defines it. Where the motive for voting is 
considered irrelevant, White argues, a situation could exist in which 
white and black voters voted for different candidates, for reasons not 
31. 478 U.S. at 67 (Brennan, J., plurality). 
32. 42 u.s.c. § 1973(b) (1988). 
33. 478 U.S. at 68 (Brennan, J., plurality); cf. Guinier, Keeping the Faith: Black Voters in the 
Post-Reagan Era, 24 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REv: 393, 420 (1989) (noting that African-Americans 
vote in greater numbers when there is a "black representative" - usually, but not necessarily, a 
black person - running). 
34. 478 U.S. at 68 (Brennan, J., plurality) ("Under § 2, it is the status of the candidate as the 
chosen representative of a particular racial group, not the race of the candidate, that is impor-
tant."). Brennan argued further that one of the evils that amended§ 2 is intended to remedy is 
precisely the fact that white voters are less likely to vote for African-American candidates -
who are more likely to be the minority voters' preferred candidates - because African-American 
candidates have less money to campaign with, less media coverage, or less education, for exam-
ple. 478 U.S. at 69. 
35. See Gingles, 478 U.S. at 66-67, 69-70. 
It would be both anomalous and inconsistent with congressional intent to hold that, on the 
one hand, the effects of past discrimination [such as poverty or inferior education] which 
hinder blacks' ability to participate in the political process tend to prove a § 2 violation, 
while holding on the other hand that, where these same effects of past discrimination deter 
whites from voting for blacks, blacks cannot make out a crucial element of a vote dilution 
claim. 
478 U.S. at 70. For a discussion of Congress' statutory elimination of an intent test, in favor of a 
results test, see infra section II.A. 
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actually involving racial discrimination, but which would still be con-
sidered racially polarized voting. 36 White offers this example: 
Suppose an eight-member multimember district that is 60% white and 
40% black, the blacks being geographically located so that two safe 
black single-member districts could be drawn. Suppose further that 
there are six white and two black Democrats running against six white 
and two black Republicans. Under Justice Brennan's test, there would 
be polarized voting and a likely § 2 violation if all the Republicans, in-
cluding the two blacks, are elected, and 80% of the blacks [in] the 
predominantly black areas vote Democratic. 37 
In his hypothetical, there is a correlation between race and different 
candidates' supporters, which also corresponds to party lines, to 
White's dissatisfaction. White would prevent this type of situation 
from establishing a section 2 claim by taking cognizance, for example, 
of the election of the two black Republican candidates as an indication 
that white voters do not vote against African-American candidates 
simply because they are African-American. Justice O'Connor, in her 
opinion concurring in the judgment, agreed with White's position.38 
Brennan, in response to O'Connor and White, would argue that it is 
irrelevant that some or any African-American candidates were elected 
by white votes; the candidates who received the African-American 
votes were not. 
The Gingles Court thus sent an extremely unclear message to the 
lower courts. 39 It is therefore not surprising that the courts have taken 
a number of different approaches to determining the level of racially 
polarized voting in a particular election district needed to trigger a 
violation of the Act. The confusion centers on the importance of the 
race of the candidate. The level of importance assigned to the candi-
date's race determines whether a court will consider all elections under 
the challenged districting scheme as relevant evidence of the presence 
or absence of racial bloc voting, or only those elections in which a 
minority candidate ran. If the candidate's race is irrelevant, all elec-
tions under the challenged scheme will be examined because the mi-
nority group will have had the opportunity to vote for a "candidate of 
their choice" in each election; courts will merely determine whether 
the candidate who received the most minority votes won or not. If, 
however, the candidate's race is to some extent relevant, then courts 
may consider whether, in a race that offered only white candidates, the 
opportunity to vote for a candidate of choice existed at all. 40 The next 
36. 478 U.S. at 83 (White, J., concurring). 
37. 478 U.S. at 83 (White, J., concurring). 
38. 478 U.S. at 101 (O'Connor, J., concurring). 
39. Abrams, supra note 27, at 464 n.107 ("confusion ... has been [Gingles'] primary leg-
acy"). For another discussion of this controversy which offers a different solution see Note, 
Defining the Minority-Preferred Candidate Under Section 2, 99 YALE L.J. 1651 (1990). 
40. For example, see infra section I.B.3. 
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three subsections will outline the three most visibly distinct ap-
proaches lower courts have taken. 
B. Following Gingles: Approaches Taken by Lower Courts 
1. Cases Finding the Race of the Candidate Irrelevant 
The first approach courts have taken is to consider the race of the 
candidate irrelevant when determining the level of racial bloc voting. 
The Tenth Circuit, in Sanchez v. Bond, 41 chose to follow precisely the 
language used in Justice Brennan's plurality opinion. The plaintiffs, 
Latino voters in Saguache County, Colorado, challenged a system of 
at-large elections of county commissioners.42 The district court held 
for the defendants, finding that the Latino community did not vote 
cohesively and, moreover, that the white community did not usually 
vote as a bloc against the preferred candidate of the Latino commu-
nity. 43 On appeal, the court of appeals affirmed the district court's 
decision. 44 
Plaintiffs argued that, among other things~ the district court im-
properly considered the election of three white Democrats as proof 
that the Latino community had been able to elect candidates of their 
choice. 45 The district court had found that Latinos in the county had 
a "very strong say as to which candidates could run on the Demo-
cratic ticket."46 The court of appeals refused to assess racially po-
larized voting using only elections which included minority 
candidates, and likewise, it refused to consider only such candidates 
when determining the success of a minority group in electing candi-
dates of its choice.47 The Sanchez court, like Brennan, quoted section 
2 to support a holding that the minority voters' "representatives of ... 
choice" need not be minorities themselves, adding that section 2 "re-
quires that [courts] make a determination from the totality of the cir-
cumstances, not from a selected set of circumstances."48 The court 
41. 875 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1989). 
42. 875 F.2d at 1489·90. 
43. 875 F.2d at 1492-93. 
44. 875 F.2d at 1497. The Tenth Circuit used a "clearly erroneous" standard of review in 
upholding the district court. 875 F.2d at 1495. 
45. 875 F.2d at 1494. 
46. 875 F.2d at 1492. 
47. 875 F.2d at 1494-95. 
48. 875 F.2d at 1495. The Supreme Court plurality did claim that it is not the race of the 
candidate, but his or her status as the minority voters' chosen representative, that is important. 
Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 68 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality). The Court's practice may 
have belied its words, however. The record in Gingles contained evidence only of races in which 
a minority candidate had run, yet the Court decided the case rather than remanding with instruc-
tions to take evidence of cases in which no minorities had run. At least one court of appeals has 
taken the Court's willingness to decide the case on such a record as an indicator that courts 
should consider only races in which minority candidates participated. See Campos v. City of 
Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1988) (The Fifth Circuit noted, among other things, that 
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also considered the unopposed election of Latino candidates as evi-
dence of the support of the white community for those candidates.49 
Thus, the Sanchez court claimed that the presence or absence of candi-
dates who were minorities was irrelevant in examining an election for 
evidence of vote dilution. 50 
A Louisiana federal district court recently followed the same ap-
proach as the Tenth Circuit. In Chisom v. Roemer, 51 plaintiffs chal-
lenged an election system in which one Louisiana Supreme Court 
justice was elected from each of five districts, and the remaining two 
justices were elected from the New Orleans area district. The New 
Orleans district included three majority-white suburban parishes and 
the Orleans parish, which had an African-American majority. Plain-
tiffs argued that electing two justices from the New Orleans district 
submerged the African-American vote in the Orleans parish in viola-
tion of section 2, and that the court could remedy the situation simply 
by splitting the district into two districts, one of which would have an 
African-American majority. 52 
In the three most recent contested elections in the district chal-
lenged in Chisom, only white candidates had run. The court examined 
the number of African-American votes and the number of white votes 
each candidate received. In each case, the candidate who had received 
the majority of the African-American vote also received the majority 
of the white vote and was elected. The court declared that each of the 
three winning candidates was therefore the minority-preferred candi-
date in his election. 53 
"Gingles itself looked only to elections where Black candidates were running" and concluded 
that the trial court in the case at bar "was warranted in its focus on those races that had a 
minority member as a candidate."); Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 
503-04 (5th Cir. 1987) ("[l]mplicit in the Gingles holding is the notion that black preference is 
determined from elections which offer the choice of a black candidate."). The Tenth Circuit 
chose in Sanchez to ignore the fact that, no matter what the Gingles plurality claimed it was 
doing, the Court accepted a record which included only races involving a minority candidate. 
875 F.2d 1488 (10th Cir. 1989). 
49. 875 F.2d at 1494. 
50. 875 F.2d at 1495 ("We do not believe that a per se rule against examining races that have 
only white candidates is implicit in Gingles. Such a rule would be clearly contrary to the plural-
ity opinion, which views the role of the candidates as irrelevant in voting analysis."). 
51. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816 (D. La.). The Chisom court applied the Act to the election 
of members of the judiciary; the Fifth Circuit later ruled application to judicial elections im-
proper in a separate case. League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620, 
631 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Houston Lawyers' Assn. v. Attorney Gen. of Texas, 
59 U.S.L.W. - (U.S. Jan. 18, 1991). Chisom is therefore not currently good law on the applica· 
tion of the Voting Rights Act to judicial elections, although the Supreme Court may revive it; it 
is this issue that the Supreme Court will decide on certiorari in Houston Lawyers' Association. 
Court to Review How Law Applies to Electing Judges, Chicago Tribune, Jan. 19, 1991, § 1, at 11, 
col. 1 (final ed.). Chisom 's analysis of racial bloc voting, however, was unaffected by the Cle-
ments decision. The same analysis would be applied to a challenge involving legislators, for 
example. 
52. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816 at 1-12. 
53. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816 at 36-37. 
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The Chisom court also found "substantial" African-American 
crossover voting for white candidates in the most recent election 
which offered African-American candidacies.54 Furthermore, the 
court considered evidence of African-American candidates' recent 
success in elections to other judicial and non-judicial offices as show-
ing that the minority community had "increased access . . . to local 
political processes."55 The court concluded that the amount of ra-
cially polarized voting was not legally significant, and that the minor-
ity community had "been able to elect their candidates of choice in a 
significant number of elections."56 
Clearly the Chisom court gave great weight to the white candi-
dates' success as indicative of minority ability to elect candidates of 
their choice. Although the court did not state explicitly, as did Bren-
nan, that "the race of the candidate per se is irrelevant,"57 the court 
obviously found Brennan's position persuasive. Thus, Chisom and 
Sanchez illustrate one approach that lower courts have taken in ana-
lyzing racial bloc voting after Gingles. These courts were able to find, 
as a result of their determining that the candidate's race is irrelevant, 
that a minority group elected its representatives even where no minor-
ity candidate ran. Because these courts evaluate no criteria besides 
receipt of the majority of the African-American vote, they ironically 
have used Brennan's language to the disadvantage of minorities. Their 
approach denies a remedy to minority plaintiffs who, having no oppor-
tunity to vote for a true representative of their community, are forced 
either to vote for the most palatable of the existing candidates or not 
vote at all. Under the Tenth Circuit's interpretation, either choice the 
plaintiffs make harms their case to some extent. 
2. Cases Not Explicitly Addressing the Issue of 
the Candidate's Race 
Another approach taken by courts uses the candidate's race in 
evaluating the level of racial bloc voting without acknowledging its 
use. While never stating this proposition explicitly, these cases sup-
port the theory that the candidate's race is a relevant factor in such an 
evaluation. 
In City of Carrollton NAACP v. Stallings, 58 the plaintiffs-appellants 
54. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816 at 38. In 1972, a special election was held to fill both seats 
available from the First Supreme Court District (the New Orleans area district). An African-
American candidate ran for each seat. Although no statistics were available showing the racial 
breakdown of the votes, neither candidate received over 21 % of the vote in either the District as 
a whole or the Orleans parish alone. The Orleans parish has an African-American voting popu-
lation of 53.6%. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816 at 30, 37-38. 
55. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816 at 31-32. 
56. 1989 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 10816 at 4344. 
57. See supra note 31 and accompanying text. 
58. 829 F.2d 1547 (11th Cir. 1987). 
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alleged that the single-county-commissioner form of government di-
luted their votes in county elections in violation of section 2. 59 The 
district court had applied the Gingles three-prong test to the plaintiffs' 
claim. It had held that, as to the third prong concerning white bloc 
voting, racially polarized voting had not been proved because the sta-
tistical evidence plaintiffs presented only included analysis of the three 
county elections in which there were African-American candidacies, 
and because it did not include analysis of state- or city-wide elections 
in which African-American candidates ran successfully. 60 In revers-
ing the district court, the Eleventh Circuit held that the success of 
African-American candidates' campaigns in city and state elections 
was not relevant to plaintiffs' claim, because only the county election 
system was being challenged and because the race of the candidate was 
irrelevant. The case turned on the success or failure of minority voters 
in Carroll County to elect candidates of their choice to county offices. 61 
The court of appeals reiterated Justice Brennan's argument that 
the candidate's race is not relevant.62 Nevertheless, in reversing as 
clearly erroneous the district court's finding that plaintiffs had not 
proved racially polarized voting, tlie court indicated by its actions that 
courts analyzing racially polarized voting should examine only races 
in which minority candidates had run. First, plaintiffs' analysis of vot-
ing patterns touched only on races in which minority candidates had 
run; they analyzed no cases in which all of the candidates were white. 
The court of appeals nevertheless found that plaintiffs had proved that 
voting was racially polarized. 63 The court, therefore, was willing to 
disregard elections not involving a minority candidate. 64 Second, the 
59. 829 F.2d at 1548. 
60. 829 F.2d at 1556. The district court also cited plaintiffs' failure to analyze a county 
election in which an African-American candidate successfully "ran" for deputy sheriff. 829 F.2d 
at 1559. The court of appeals pointed out that in that election the African-American candidate 
was not elected; the white candidate for sheriff was elected, and as a member of his ticket, the 
African-American candidate was appointed to the deputy office. 829 F.2d at 1559. 
61. 829 F.2d at 1558. But cf Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 
503 (5th Cir. 1988) ("Because the district court had statistical data of only two Gretna alder-
manic elections to consider, it properly looked to voting patterns in two additional elections in 
which Gretna voters had the opportunity to vote for a black candidate."). 
62. 829 F.2d at 1557 n.12, 1558. 
63. 829 F.2d at 1559. 
64. The court's willingness to find racially polarized voting although the record contained no 
evidence of races which lacked minority candidates is some indication that it would have consid-
ered such evidence irrelevant if the evidence had been offered. The Act requires a violation of 
section 2 to be "established •.. based on the totality of circumstances." 42 U.S.C. § 1973(b) 
(1988). This langnage is hardly stock statutory filler; the Supreme Court's decision in White v. 
Regester supplied these words, as well as much of the rest of the language of§ 2(b). 412 U.S. 
755, 769 (1973);see SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 21, reprinted at 199. Thus, arguably, any 
evidence comprising the relevant "totality of circumstances," see infra text accompanying notes 
167-69, is necessary to a determination of racial bloc voting. It follows that any evidence the 
Carrollton court was willing to decide the case without should have been irrelevant to the deter-
mination. 
This interpretation is not at all inevitable, however, in that the opinion does not indicate that 
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appellate court rejected the district court's argument that plaintiffs 
should have analyzed another campaign, in which the appellate court 
found that no African-Americans had run. 65 The court's holding was 
only that analysis of the election was unnecessary to the plaintiffs' 
case; the words it used to reach that holding, however, suggest that the 
election was not even relevant: "It is the access of minority voters to 
the political process, not [white candidates'] access to the black vote, 
which is the chief concern of Section 2 .... "66 Requiring the plaintiffs 
to analyze elections in which no minority candidates have run "mis-
construes the theory of vote dilution. " 67 
The Fourth Circuit, in Collins v. City of Norfolk, 68 explicitly de-
nied any need to address the issue created by the Supreme Court's 
conflicting opinions on the relevance of the candidate's race in decid-
ing the case. 69 Its holding lends even more support, however, than 
that in Carrollton for the position that the race of the candidate is 
relevant. Collins found it intuitively reasonable that the minority can-
didate, in a race against a white candidate, is the minority group's 
candidate of choice. 70 
Plaintiffs in Collins challenged the at-large system of voting for city 
council members. The district court found for the defendants, based 
on its determination that "Norfolk's whites do not vote sufficiently as 
a bloc that they usually defeat the minority's preferred candidate."71 
The court of appeals reversed, finding fault with the district court's 
method of determining who is the minority's preferred candidate. 72 
The district court consistently found that white candidates who re-
either party directly raised the issue of whether races not involving minority candidates were 
relevant to the racial-polarization inquiry. Given appellate courts' general reluctance to consider 
issues that have not been briefed and argued, see United States v. Godoy, 821 F.2d 1498, 1504 
(11th Cir. 1987) ("The general rule ..• is that an appellate court will not consider a legal issue 
unless it was presented to the trial court."); 9 J. MOORE, B. WARD & J. LUCAS, MOORE'S FED-
ERAL PRACTICE 1] 228.02 [2.-1) (1986), ifthe parties did not raise the issue, one might argue, the 
appellate court may not have considered it explicitly. 
65. In this race, a white candidate had run for sheriff and an African-American was named 
on his ticket as a deputy Sheriff. The district court had concluded that the African-American 
was a candidate and stated that the failure to analyze this race "cast[) doubt on the ultimate 
conclusions of [plaintiff's} eipert." 829 F.2d at 1556 (quoting district court). The court of ap-
peals concluded that the African-American was not a candidate but rather a prospective ap-
pointee. 829 F.2d at 1559. 
66. 829 F.2d at 1559. 
67. 829 F.2d at 1559. The mere fact that plaintiffs were not required to present the evidence 
does not mean that it would not have been relevant if defendants had presented it. The court's 
rationale, however - that § 2 is not concerned with "the majority's" access to "the black vote" 
in elections without minorities - suggests that such elections are not relevant to vote-dilution 
claims. 
68. 883 F.2d 1232 (4th Cir. 1989). 
69. 883 F.2d at 1237 n.7. 
70. See infra text accompanying notes 77-78. 
71. Collins v. City of Norfolk, 679 F. Supp. 557, 566 (E.D. Va. 1988). 
72. Collins, 883 F.2d at 1234-35. 
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ceived a majority of the African-American community's vote were the 
minority-preferred candidates. 73 As a result, because those white can-
didates were elected, the district court was able to report that racial 
bloc voting had not prevented the minority community from electing 
the representative of its choice. 74 In those same elections, however, 
each voter was allowed to cast a ballot for each seat of the city council, 
making it possible for African-American candidates to run, to win 
even higher percentages of the African-American vote than the white 
candidates who were elected, yet to be defeated. 75 The district court 
did not consider the candidates in this category to be the minorities' 
candidates of choice. 76 
The court of appeals found the district court's result 
counterintuitive: 
The mere election of a candidate who appears to have received votes 
from more than fifty percent of minority ballots does not count as a mi-
nority electoral success, when each ballot may contain votes for more 
than one candidate. In such a situation, if there were other candidates, 
preferred by a significantly higher percentage of the minority commu-
nity, who were defeated in the same election, then it cannot fairly be said 
that the minority community has successfully elected representatives of 
its choice. Each such situation must be reviewed individually to deter-
mine whether the elected candidates can be fairly considered as repre-
sentatives of the minority community. The presumption must be that 
they cannot, if some other candidate has received significantly more mi-
nority votes. 77 
Thus, while the Fourth Circuit maintains that it will not address the 
relevancy of the race of the candidate, its holding reflects a concern 
that if a candidate who receives a large number of minority votes is 
elected, she will be considered the minority preferred candidate, de-
spite the existence of a more clearly preferred minority candidate who 
suffered defeat. The possibility of such a result disturbed the court 
because it would skew the evidence toward a showing that minorities 
are able to elect the candidates of their choice. Probably, had an Afri-
can-American candidate received the second-largest number of minor-
ity votes, and had this candidate won the election, the court would 
have felt less compelled to inquire whether the candidate was a minor-
ity representative.78 The court requires non-minority candidates to 
73. 883 F.2d at 1238. 
74. 679 F. Supp. at 574-75. 
75. 883 F.2d at 1238. 
76. 679 F. Supp. at 574-75. 
77. 883 F.2d at 1238 (quoting Collins v. City of Norfolk, 816 F.2d 932, 937 (4th Cir. 1987)). 
78. See 883 F.2d at 1238-39 (attempting to ascertain whether the elected white candidates 
who had received a majority of the African-American vote were representatives of the African 
American community, but not applying the same procedure to the African-American candi-
dates). But for one example to the contrary, see Justice White's hypothetical, supra text accom-
panying note 37. 
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prove their status as minority representatives, without requiring the 
same of minority candidates, because, presumptively, tracking the suc-
cess of minority candidates seems like a more accurate way to trace 
the success of minority voters in electing candidates of their choice. 
Like the Eleventh Circuit in Carrollton, the Fourth Circuit thus sup-
ports the proposition that the race of the candidate is relevant to a 
racial bloc voting analysis. This support is, however, unstated, and 
illustrates an approach to the question different from that of the two 
cases in the following section. 
3. Cases Finding the Candidate's Race Relevant 
The Fifth Circuit, first in Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of 
Gretna, 79 and a year later in Campos v. City of Baytown, 80 disregarded 
Brennan's plurality opinion and instead applied a theory that the can-
didate's race must be considered in a racial bloc voting assessment. In 
Gretna, the plaintiffs challenged an at-large system for the election of 
alderpersons as an impermissible dilution of the minority community's 
votes. 81 Defendants forced the appellate court to confront the rele-
vance of the candidate's race head on, by assigning as error the fact 
that the district court only considered elections containing African-
American candidates. 
The Fifth Circuit stated: "We consider Jones to be an aldermanic 
candidate sponsored by Gretna's minority group because he received a 
significant portion of the black vote, and because he is black."82 The 
court concluded that it was free to establish whatever standard it 
found proper, since Brennan's opinion on this issue carried only the 
weight of a plurality and, therefore, was not binding. While discard-
ing the language of Gingles, the Fifth Circuit explicitly based its hold-
ing on the Gingles Court's conduct. 83 The court of appeals held that as 
long as the minority community has the opportunity to vote for a "via-
ble" minority candidate, the candidate's race will be otherwise "of less 
significance than the race of the voter."84 In other words, the Fifth 
Circuit decided that it will assess the level of racial bloc voting in a 
challenged district using only those elections containing a serious mi-
nority candidate, but will not otherwise consider the race of the candi-
date as significant. 
In Campos, the Fifth Circuit solidified its position. Plaintiffs, 
79. 834 F.2d 496 (5th Cir. 1987). 
80. 840 F.2d 1240 (5th Cir. 1988). 
81. 834 F.2d at 497. 
82. 834 F.2d at 503 (footnote omitted). 
83. 834 F.2d at 503 ("[A]lthough the Supreme Court plurality in Gingles emphasizes the race 
of the voter over the race of the candidate, it upholds the trial court finding of vote dilution based 
upon analyses of only those elections in which blacks ran."); see supra text accompanying note 
34. 
84. 834 F.2d at 503. 
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members of both the African-American community and the Latino 
community, challenged an at-large voting system, as in Gretna. 85 De-
fendants, relying on Brennan's language that the focus should be on a 
candidate's status as minority community representative, charged, as 
in Gretna, that the district court had erred in considering only elec-
tions in which a minority candidate opposed a white candidate. 86 The 
Fifth Circuit reiterated that the focus on the candidate's race was 
proper. Pointing out that simply being African-American or Latino is 
not enough to make a candidate the minority's candidate of choice, 87 
the court emphasized that the minority-preferred candidate must be 
"sponsored by the minority group."88 According to the Fifth Circuit, 
a candidate is sponsored when she both is a member of a minority and 
receives strong minority voting support. 89 The Fifth Circuit thus illus-
trates a third approach to analyzing racially polarized voting in a Vot-
ing Rights section 2 claim. 
In sum, the line of judicial interpretation which argues that the 
race of the candidate is irrelevant in determining whether racial bloc 
voting exists focuses on: (1) ensuring that defendants do not use the 
race of the candidate as a means of circumventing congressional in-
tent;90 (2) following the language of section 2 in considering only a 
candidate's status as the minority group's "representatives of . . . 
choice";91 and, (3) considering "the totality of the circumstances," as 
also required by the language of section 2, by not excluding any elec-
tions under the challenged electoral system from consideration.92 
The other line of interpretation, which regards the race of the can-
didate as relevant, argues that: (1) intuitively it seems easier to trace a 
more accurate, logical picture of the minority community's success in 
electing candidates of their choice by considering only those elections 
in which a minority candidate ran;93 (2) ignoring the candidate's race 
could lead to findings of racial bloc voting that were actually reflec-
tions of interest group politics as opposed to intentional or uninten-
85. 840 F.2d 1240, 1242 (5th Cir. 1988). 
86. 840 F.2d at 1245. 
87. See 840 F.2d at 1245 n.7. 
88. 840 F.2d at 1245. 
89. 840 F.2d at 1245 (quoting Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 
503 (5th Cir. 1987)). "[T]he court [need not] look at every election where there is a minority 
candidate. If the minority candidate is not serious and gains little support from any segment of 
the community, it cannot be said that the minority community 'sponsored' the candidate •••. " 
840 F.2d at 1245 n.7. 
90. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
91. Gingles, 478 U.S. at 67; see supra note 32 and accompanying text. 
92. Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488, 1494 (10th Cir. 1989); see supra note 48 and accompa-
nying text. 
93. City of Carrollton NAACP v. Stallings, 829 F.2d 1547, 1556-59 (11th Cir. 1987), cert. 
denied, 485 U.S. 936 (1988); see supra notes 77-78 and accompanying text. 
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tional discrimination;94 and (3) only a minority candidate sponsored 
by the minority group can be considered their "chosen representa-
tive. "95 This line of interpretation includes the approaches of the· 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits, because their practices in these cases 
support the theory that the candidate's race is relevant.96 
To determine the best way of approaching an analysis of racially 
polarized voting in a challenged district it is important to understand 
amended section 2 and what function Congress intended it to have. 
Part II attempts to outline this function briefly. 
II. CONGRESSIONAL INTENT: THE LEGISLATIVE HISTORY OF 
SECTION 2 
This Part studies the legislative history of section 2 and concludes 
that it was intended to break down the barriers to full minority partici-
pation in politics. The first section of this Part shows that Congress 
was determined to replace an intent test - which required vote dilu-
tion plaintiffs to prove discriminatory intent on the part of the legisla-
ture or legislators who instituted the challenged practice - with a 
results test - which merely requires such plaintiffs to prove that the 
practice causes discriminatory results. The second section documents 
Congress' realization that section 2 could be an instrument for procur-
ing greater responsiveness to the minority community from elected of-
ficials. Congress also intended section 2 to provide minorities with 
access to the full political process, as shown in the third section. 
A. Replacement of the Intent Test with the Results Test 
Congress' overriding purpose in amending section 2 was to over-
rule statutorily the Supreme Court decision in City of Mobile v. 
Bolden, 97 which introduced an intent test into vote dilution litiga-
tion. 98 In Bolden, the Court held that plaintiffs must prove that de-
fendants instituted the challenged electoral procedure for a 
discriminatory reason.99 This requirement significantly increased the 
burden on plaintiffs, where proof of a procedure's discriminatory re-
sults alone had previously been suffi.cient.100 Under Bolden, plaintiffs 
94. 478 U.S. at 83 (White, J., concurring); see supra note 35 and accompanying text; see also 
Citizens for a Better Gretna v. City of Gretna, 834 F.2d 496, 503 (5th Cir. 1987). 
95. See supra notes 82-88 and accompanying text. 
96. See supra section I.B.2. 
97. 446 U.S. 55 (1980). 
98. SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 16,,reprinted at 193. 
99. Id; Bolden, 446 U.S. at 70 ("[W]here the character of a law is readily explainable on 
grounds apart from race, as would nearly always be true where, as here, an entire system oflocal 
governance is brought into question, disproportionate impact alone cannot be decisive, and courts 
must look to other evidence to support a finding of discriminatory purpose." (emphasis added)). 
100. SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 16, 19 n.59, reprinted at 193, 196 n.59_. 
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needed to conduct extensive research into the history of the legislature 
that had enacted the challenged system, in order to prove discrimina-
tory intent on the part of either the legislature or individual 
legislators. Io I 
Senator Kennedy complained of three inadequacies of the Bolden 
intent test. First, the intent test was "divisive,'' requiring minority 
groups to "identify[ ] public officials or whole communities as ra-
cist." 102 Second, it allowed "defendants ... to offer manufactured 
evidence of an alternative nonracial explanation for the challenged 
procedure,'' so that even in cases where a legislature did have a dis-
criminatory intent in enacting a certain procedure, intent would be 
difficult to prove. I03 Third, the presence or absence of such intent was 
"the wrong question,'' in any event. "If a minority citizen is denied 
equal opportunity to participate in the political process, then that in-
equity should be corrected, regardless of what may or may not have 
been in someone's mind 100 years ago."I04 
Congress, to reinstate its original purpose in enacting section 2, Ios 
codified a results test - as articulated in White v. Regester, Io6 a 1973 
Supreme Court decision - which provides that plaintiffs need not 
prove discriminatory intent in a vote dilution case to prevail. I07 Thus, 
subsection (a) guarantees that: 
(a) No voting qualification or prerequisite to voting or standard, prac-
tice, or procedure shall be imposed or applied by any State or political 
subdivision in a manner which results in a denial or abridgement of the 
right of any citizen of the United States to vote on account of race or 
color, or in contravention of the guarantees set forth in section 
1973b(f)(2) of this article, as provided in subsection (b) of this 
section. 108 
Congress, by enacting the amendment, indicated its agreement with 
Senator Kennedy that the results test was a fairer, more effective stan-
dard for the achievement of an equal opportunity for minority 
participation. Io9 
Based on this history, Justice Brennan was quite correct to be con-
cerned about any standard for analyzing racially polarized voting 
which might allow defendants to incorporate a back-door intent 
101. Id. at 26, 27, reprinted at 204; see 128 CONG. REc. 13,132 (1982) (statement of Sen. 
Dole) (discussing practical and conceptual difficulties with proving discriminatory intent). 
102. 128 CONG. REc. 13,172 (1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
103. Id.; Engstrom & Wildgen, Pruning Thoms from the Thicket: An Empirical Test of the 
Existence of Racial Gerrymandering. 2 LEGIS. STUD. Q. 465, 467-68 (1977). 
104. 128 CONG. REc. 13,172 (1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
105. Id. 
106. 412 U.S. 755 (1973). 
107. SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 28, reprinted at 205. 
108. 42 U.S.C. § 1973 (1988) (emphasis added). 
109. See 128 CONG. REc. 13,172 (1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
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test. 110 Defendants in Gingles proposed that racial bloc voting could 
be shown only when whites refused to vote for an African-American 
candidate solely because of the candidate's race, not when they with-
held their votes because of unfamiliarity with his name, for exam-
ple.111 Brennan viewed this as merely an attempt to require plaintiffs 
to prove racial hostility and discriminatory intent on the part of the 
voting public, as opposed to the legislature.112 As such a requirement 
would be directly contrary to congressional intent behind section 2, 113 
Brennan declared the race of the candidate irrelevant to an analysis of 
racially polarized voting, which focuses exclusively on the race of the 
voter. 114 His position is understandable, given the emphasis Congress 
placed on allowing plaintiffs to prove vote dilution without requiring 
proof of discriminatory intent. 
B. Election of Officials Who Are More Responsive to Minorities 
In amending section 2, Congress also aimed to prevent elected offi-
cials from being insensitive to the needs of the minority community. 
The legislative history of the amendment documents this concern. 
Congress listed nine factors which typically evidence a section 2 viola-
tion; two of the nine relate to insensitivity to minority needs. 115 First, 
the Senate Report accompanying the amendment explicitly cited the 
110. See supra notes 29-34 and accompanying text. 
111. Ging/es, 478 U.S. 30, 69 (1986); cf supra note 34. 
112. 478 U.S. at 69-73. 
113. See supra note 109 and accompanying text. 
114. 478 U.S. at 67. 
115. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 28-29, reprinted at 206-07. The nine factors 
listed were 
1. the extent of any history of official discrimination in the state or political subdivision 
that touched the right of the members of the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise 
to participate in the democratic process; 
2. the extent to which voting in the elections of the state or political subdivision is 
racially polarized; 
3. the extent to which the state or political subdivision has used unusually large elec-
tion districts, majority vote requirements, anti-single shot provisions, or other voting prac-
tices or procedures that may enhance the opportunity for discrimination against the 
minority group; 
4. if there is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority group 
have been denied access to that process; 
5. the extent to which members of the minority group in the state or political subdivi-
sion bear the effects of discrimination in such areas as education, employment and health, 
which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the political process; 
6. whether political campaigns have been characterized by overt or subtle racial ap-
peals; 
7. the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public office 
in the jurisdiction. 
Additional[ly] ••. : 
whether there is a significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the 
particularized needs of the members of the minority group. 
whether the policy underlying the state or political subdivision's use of such voting qual-
ification, prerequisite to voting, or standard, practice or procedure is tenuous. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
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"significant lack of responsiveness on the part of elected officials to the 
particularized needs of the members of the minority group" as having 
probative value. 116 Second, "whether political campaigns have been 
characterized by overt or subtle racial appeals" was a factor that the 
Senate Committee agreed was probative of a violation of section 2.117 
Ours is a representative democracy, and therefore, the full right to 
vote is "essential."118 By voting, Americans may express their wishes 
to their elected officials, who should, in most cases, act on those 
wishes. 119 An indication of whether a government is truly representa-
tive - whether the governed are really represented by the governing 
- is the degree of responsiveness that government shows. 12° When 
the governing are held accountable to the governed through the elec-
tive process, they will be responsive: 
Even under the most favorable conditions provided by the social en-
vironment and the immediate political context, governors will be respon-
sive to community wishes or needs if, and perhaps only if, they are held 
accountable for their actions and decisions. . . . 
Accountability means that there are standards against which the per-
formance of officeholders can be measured. If these standards are not 
met or are violated, officeholders will be removed from office. In a de-
mocracy, these standards are not just legal and formal requirements for 
appropriate conduct, but the wishes and welfare of the citizenry the gov-
ernors are chosen to represent. Governors failing to meet these exacting 
standards are held accountable, and it is for this reason that there is a 
strong presumption that they will strive to be responsive to the 
citizenry.121 
Congress clearly recognized the relationship between a minority 
group's inability to influence elections and a candidate's or official's 
ability to ignore the concerns of that group.122 Where the voting 
power of a minority group has been so divided or diluted that a candi-
date can comfortably be elected without addressing that group's needs, 
those needs may well go unaddressed. 123 Thus, logically, a showing 
116. Id. at 29, reprinted at 207. 
117. Id. at 29, reprinted at 206. 
118. 128 CoNG. REc. 13,171 (1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy). 
119. H. PITKIN, THE CoNCEPT OF REPRESENTATION 232·33 (1967). 
120. Id. at 232 ("[W]e show a government to be representative ••• by demonstrating that its 
subjects have control over what it does ..•. A representative government must not merely •• , 
promote the public interest, but must also be responsive to the people."). 
121. H. EULAU & K. PREWfIT, LABYRINTHS OF DEMOCRACY: ADAPTATIONS, LINKAGES, 
REPRESENTATION, AND POLICIES IN URBAN POLITICS 444 (1973). 
122. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REc. 13,171 (1982) (statement of Sen. Kennedy) ("Without full 
enjoyment of the right to vote, a citizen cannot be sure he or she will have a fair opportunity to 
protect his or her other rights or to ask the Government to listen to his or her concerns."). 
123. See Abrams, supra note 27, at 476 ("If minority voters have more opportunity to par-
ticipate, they may compel legislators to redress [their] grievances ..•• "). Interestingly, one 
scholar has noted that a candidate who seemingly cannot win an election without the minority 
"swing vote" may refuse to address minority issues anyway, preferring not to risk alienating 
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that candidates in a certain election district have run on overtly racist 
platforms is an indication, as Congress perceived, of a possible section 
2 violation in that district.124 Such candidates must certainly have no 
need of the minority vote, and thus probably are not and need not be 
sensitive to minority concems.12s 
Thus, courts which implicitly or explicitly found the race of the 
candidate relevant were responding to Congress' goal of electing offi-
cials who are more responsive to the minority community, in so far as 
they believed that minority officials were more likely to be responsive 
to the minority community. For example, the Fourth Circuit clearly 
holds this belief, as the facts of Collins v. City of Norfolk support.126 
The district court deemed two white candidates the minority candi-
dates of choice in elections in 1974 and 1980, passing over two Afri-
can-American candidates who received even greater percentages of 
African-American votes. The two white candidates, however, them-
selves testified that they were not minority community representa-
tives.127 They had either ignored, avoided, or opposed the position of 
the African-Americans who voted for them. 128 African-American 
candidates are seen as more likely to be representatives of the African-
American community because they are more likely to live with that 
community and share its experiences.129 The Fourth Circuit, and the 
Fifth Circuit as well in its decisions, were sensitive to Congress' con-
cern that elected officials respond more frequently and effectively to 
minority issues. 
C. Incorporation of Minority Voters into the Political Process 
A third important purpose of section 2 as amended is to provide 
equal opportunity of access for minorities "to participate in the polit-
current or potential white supporters. See Guinier, supra note 33, at 415 (discussing the Demo-
cratic Party's recent attempt to distance itself from the concerns of African-American voters). 
124. As recently as November 6, 1990, a candidate-Jesse Helms - was elected who ran on 
a racist platform. In his senatorial campaign against Harvey Gantt, an African-American candi-
date and the former mayor of Charlotte, North Carolina, Helms aired a television ad that may 
have won the election for him. 
The ad showed a man's hands - white hands - crumpling a piece of paper. The paper 
was a rejection letter from a prospective employer. Over the pictures was this narration: 
"You needed that job, and you were the best qualified. But they had to give it to a minority 
because of a racial quota. Is that really fair?" 
Daley, TV Holds Power in Politics, Chicago Tribune, Nov. 19, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 2 (final ed.). 
Gantt had openly supported the 1990 Civil Rights Act, which Helms has interpreted as setting 
quotas. Id. 
125. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 29, reprinted at 206. 
126. See supra notes 68-78 and accompanying text. 
127. See Collins v. City of Norfolk, 883 F.2d 1232, 1238-39 (4th Cir. 1989). 
128. 883 F.2d at 1239 (One candidate commented, " 'There are problems in the black com-
munity right now which I don't care to be involved in, so I'm not.' "). 
129. See 883 F.2d at 1238-39. 
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ical process and to elect representatives of their choice."130 A study 
of the legislative history leaves no doubt that Congress intended sec-
tion 2 to protect more than the bare right to mark a ballot on election 
day.131 Literally borrowing the following language from White v. 
Regester, 132 Congress clarified what the protected voting right consists 
of: 
The plaintiffs' burden is to produce evidence to support findings that the 
political processes leading to nomination and election were not equally 
open to participation by the group in question - that its members had 
less opportunity than did other residents in the district to participate in 
the political processes and to elect legislators of their choice.133 
White is clearly the basis for subsection (b)134 of the statute which 
defines a violation of section 2. Thus, Congress provided a mechanism 
to make it possible for minority groups to participate in all phases of 
the political process, not merely on election day.13s 
The language of "political process" is used consistently throughout 
the legislative history.136 In addition, two of the nine factors Congress 
suggested for consideration in section 2 cases support this emphasis on 
the political process. The first factor Congress listed requires courts to 
consider "the extent of any history of official discrimination in the 
state or political subdivision that touched the right of the members of 
the minority group to register, to vote, or otherwise to participate in the 
democratic process." 137 Another factor requires courts to ask, "if there 
is a candidate slating process, whether the members of the minority 
group have access to that process."138 By focusing on parts of the 
political process which precede and follow election day, and by using 
such language both in the legislative history and in the statute itself, 
Congress pointedly provided for the incorporation of minority com-
munities into the whole political process. 
The courts which decided the cases examined in this Note have 
neglected to address this congressional concern with incorporation. It 
is, however, no less important because of that neglect. Although it has 
not formed the basis for any court's approach to the relevance of the 
candidate's race in a vote dilution claim so far, it does inform the ap-
proach this Note recommends in Part III. Courts could more easily 
130. 42 u.s.c. § 1973(b) (1988). 
131. See, e.g., 128 CONG. REc. 13,293-94 (1982) (statement of Sen. Grassley). 
132. 412 U.S. 755 (1973); SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 21, reprinted at 199. For a 
brief discussion of the results test see supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text. 
133. 412 U.S. at 766. 
134. See supra note 18 for text of subsection (b). 
135. For a discussion of why this range of participation is and should be important see infra 
notes 140-55 and accompanying text. 
136. See generally SENATE REPORT, supra note 15; see also Abrams, supra note 27, at 459. 
137. SENATE REPORT, supra note IS, at 28, reprinted at 206 (emphasis added). 
138. Id. at 29, reprinted at 206. 
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identify the minority community's candidate of choice if there were 
evidence of this choice throughout the political process rather than 
only on election day. 
Thus, Congress has attempted to use section 2: (1) to replace the 
intent test with the results test; (2) to force elected officials to be more 
responsive to minority groups; and, (3) to incorporate minority voters 
into the entire political process. These goals suggest that Congress 
valued the participation of minorities in the political process, and un-
derstood that their problems have often been magnified by their exclu-
sion. Congress intended that section 2 make it possible for minority 
groups to remove discriminatory obstacles to their full participation. 
III. MINORITY COMMUNITY SPONSORSHIP 
Against this backdrop of Congress' intent, Part III returns to the 
task of determining the appropriate approach to defining racially po-
larized voting. First, taking into account recent emphasis on the bene-
fits of minority civic inclusion, Part III offers "minority 
sponsorship"139 as the key to identifying the minority-preferred candi-
date. Then, Part III examines the sponsorship approach in light of the 
concerns of the Justices and courts as summarized in the last 
paragraphs of Part I. By examining the concerns important to each 
side of the issue, this Note shows that the minority sponsorship ap-
proach satisfies the concerns of both. 
A. Minority-Preferred Equals Minority-Sponsored 
1. The Importance of Minority Civic Inclusion 
A theme that runs through much of the recent scholarship on sec-
tion 2 of the Voting Rights Act is that the civic inclusion of minorities 
is extremely important. 140 This "civic inclusion" is what Congress 
meant by its "participat[ion] in the political process" language. 141 En-
visioned is minority participation in legislative lobbying, in meeting 
and talking with their representatives and with other groups, in form-
ing electoral coalitions and legislative alliances, 142 in nominating143 
and slating144 candidates - in all "phase[s] of the electoral 
process.,, 145 
Scholars have offered various reasons for emphasizing the goal of 
139. "Minority sponsorship" is defined in full infra notes 157.59 and accompanying text. 
Briefly, it is a minority community's active support of a candidate's campaign from beginning to 
end of the election process. 
140. See generally Abrams, supra note 27; Guinier, supra note 33; Karlan, supra note 21. 
141. 42 u.s.c. § 1973(b) (1988). 
142. See Abrams, supra note 27, at 460. 
143. See Guinier, supra note 33, at 422. 
144. See Karlan, supra note 21, at 198. 
145. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 30, reprinted at 207. 
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increased minority participation. Professor Lani Guinier argues that 
"equal status as participants within the political sphere is possible [for 
minorities] only if members of the [minority] group are allowed to par-
ticipate at all stages of the process."146 Equal opportunity to mark the 
ballot is a necessary part, but not the equivalent, of the equal opportu-
nity to participate in the political process. A vote is worth more, an-
other scholar argues, both to the individual voter and in terms of its 
translation into political power, when the voter can use it to elect the 
candidate and the platform that the voter's community placed on the 
ballot.147 Guinier notes th~t being eternally relegated to the position 
of swing vote is no longer acceptable to the African-American 
community.148 
Professor Kathryn Abrams' article discusses several benefits of mi-
nority political participation. From the perspective of the minority 
group, civic inclusion can enhance governmental responsiveness, 149 al-
low the group to be more self-determining, and strengthen the group's 
bonds.15° From the perspective of the nonminority, civic inclusion of 
minorities can bring benefits in the form of racial diversity in govern-
ment and the legitimation of the government for the minority citizens 
it governs.151 
Civic inclusion, according to Professor Pamela Karlan, affords mi-
nority candidates the opportunity, by electing minority candidates to 
office, to participate in the actual decisionmaking process. Minority 
officials, she argues, wield influence by voicing the concerns and advo-
cating the interests of their minority constituents to a small, but pow-
erful group - such as a city council. 152 Moreover, when a minority 
official represents a minority community on the governing body, that 
community has a voice in each decision the body makes, as opposed to 
only one decision regarding for whom to vote.153 
This focus on civic inclusion in relation to section 2 is proper, be-
146. Guinier, supra note 33, at 426. 
147. See Abrams, supra note 27, at 476-77. 
148. Guinier, supra note 33, at 422. 
149. Abrams, supra note 27, at 460, 476. 
150. Id. at 477. 
151. Id. at 477-79. A racially diverse government, says Abrams, is better able to consider all 
the advantages and disadvantages of issues, and even to perceive previously unseen issues, due to 
the different perspectives minority officials can bring to the governing body. Id. at 478. 
Abrams defines the legitimation of government as a way of running government that 
"make[s] it acceptable to those who live under it, and that make[s] the laws enacted by it worthy 
of being followed." Id. at 479. This includes a formal component - attained by following its 
own laws - and a substantive component - attained when the government is consistent with 
the general societal notions regarding humanity and the political system. Id. Minorities are 
more likely to comply willingly with the laws of a society that they feel they have had a part in 
making. 
152. Karlan, supra note 21, at 216, 218. 
153. Id. at 217. 
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cause the language of the statute - "to participate in the political 
process"154 - supports it. Further, the civic inclusion focus is com-
patible with Congress' goals in amending section 2, particularly the 
goal of incorporating minority voters into the entire electoral process, 
which is practically identical to the goal of civic inclusion.155 
2. The Minority Sponsorship Approach as a Solution 
None of the judicial approaches for determining the relevance of a 
candidate's race discussed in Part I are completely satisfactory. While 
Justice Brennan's irrelevance approach properly dispels the return of 
the intent test, its wording hinders courts in taking into account the 
candidate's race where it may be very relevant; in terms of responsive-
ness, for example. The approach taken by Justice White is unaccept-
able in that it indeed emasculates the "results" -oriented amendment. 
The Tenth Circuit's approach ignores two purposes of section 2: that 
of increasing responsiveness to the minority community, and that of 
incorporating the minority community into the political process. The 
Fourth and Eleventh Circuits fail to acknowledge the issue, which 
merely adds to the confusion. And finally, the Fifth Circuit's ap-
proach does not allow for the improveme~t of race relations through 
cooperation envisioned by proponents of the minority civic inclusion 
theory. 
The analyses of section 2 and the civic inclusion theory suggest 
that, rather, the answer lies somewhere between Justice Brennan's the-
ory of irrelevance and the Fifth Circuit's insistence on its primacy. 
The best approach relies on sponsorship: the minority community's 
"representative of choice" can only be a candidate who was sponsored 
by that community.156 
The minority sponsorship approach requires a court faced with a 
Gingles-type vote dilution claim to follow three basic steps. First, it 
must determine whether the minority group can be drawn as the ma-
jority of a single-member district, as directed by the first Gingles 
prong. 157 Next, the court should look generally at past elections under 
the challenged system to decide whether the minority community 
votes as a group, the second Gingles prong. If so, the court must then 
decide which of those elections afforded the minority community an 
opportunity to elect a representative of their choice, by asking whether 
a candidate in each election was sponsored by that community. 
154. 42 u.s.c. § 1973(b) (1988). 
155. See supra notes 130-38 and accompanying text. 
156. This solution borrows its language from, and was inspired by, both the Fifth Circuit's 
opinion in Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1988), and Professor 
Guinier's article, Guinier, supra note 33, at 420. 
157. This solution is proposed in relation to "ability to elect" claims only. "Ability to influ-
ence" claims are beyond the scope of this Note. See supra note 21 and accompanying text. 
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The race of the candidate will not determine which elections a 
court should consider when looking for evidence of racial bloc voting; 
however, the presence of a minority candidate in an election should 
serve as a useful starting point, indicating a strong likelihood that the 
minority community had sponsored a candidate in that race. The em-
phasis on the minority group's sponsorship will satisfy proponents of a 
focus on civic inclusion, in that the court could find sponsorship only 
where the minority group had been involved in supporting a candidate 
throughout the process. A finding that the group had been financially 
active in a campaign would be only one signal. Evidence that the mi-
nority community ran or significantly staffed the campaign, that the 
community made efforts to build coalitions with white voters, or that, 
to the extent possible, the community had a hand in the candidate's 
nomination or slating158--efforts like these would distinguish a minor-
ity-sponsored candidate from one who merely received the endorse-
ment of the community within a "lesser of two evils," swing-vote 
context. 159 At that point, the court could proceed to consider whether 
the white voters voted as a bloc against the minority-preferred, minor-
ity-sponsored candidate. If so, the plaintiffs have proved their prima 
facie case. 
As is the case under more than one of the approaches previously 
used in the courts, every election will not include a minority-preferred 
candidate. The racial bloc voting evaluation would be made only in 
the context of those elections offering a minority-sponsored candidate. 
It is not to be expected that many elections in some areas of the coun-
try will meet this standard immediately; where this is true, it will in 
and of itself constitute evidence of vote dilution. 
As well as satisfying the proponents of minority civic inclusion, the 
sponsorship approach offers a method of evaluating racial bloc voting 
consistently with congressional intent for section 2. First, the goal of 
minority incorporation into the political process is satisfied when the 
minority civic inclusion theory is fulfilled. Next, because the race of 
the candidate does not determine, explicitly or implicitly, the identity 
of the minority-preferred candidate, the use of an intent test as applied 
to white voters becomes useless. Further, the candidate as an elected 
official will be responsive to the minority community, because its peo-
ple will have worked to place the candidate in office, thus assuring that 
the candidate will be familiar with and sympathetic to the commu-
nity's problems. Moreover, even nonminority-sponsored officials will 
be compelled to be more responsive to the minority community, due to 
its increased influence on election outcomes. 
158. Cf. supra text accompanying notes 140-45 (describing civic inclusion as minority partic-
ipation in the very activities which would support a finding of minority sponsorship of a 
candidate). 
159. See supra note 148 and accompanying text. 
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The minority sponsorship approach does not deemphasize the im-
portance of having minority candidates and elected officials. As dis-
cussed earlier, 160 both minorities and nonminorities benefit simply 
from having officials with diverse perspectives able to speak to each 
governmental issue as it arises. Further, it is unlikely that a legislature 
aiming for minority participation in the political process would have 
the participation stop just short of the governing aspect of that pro-
cess. The focus of section 2, however, must rest on empowering mi-
nority voters to put in representatives of any race who will, because 
they must, be active in pursuing minority objectives. 
The next subsection tests the suggested approach against the con-
cerns articulated under both lines of interpretation discussed in Part 
I.161 Although the approach takes the name from the language of the 
Fifth Circuit in Campos, 162 it is not identical to that court's approach 
or to any other taken in the cases discussed. Therefore, the sponsor-
ship approach must be tested against the concerns of all. 
B. Examining the Minority-Group Sponsorship Approach 
First, Justice Brennan was seriously concerned in Gingles that if 
the race of the candidate were considered relevant in a vote dilution 
claim, defendants would use this factor to get an intent test back into 
the litigation. 163 He worried that defendants would argue that whites 
voted as a bloc against the minority-preferred candidate, not because 
he was Latino, but rather because he was uneducated, unfamiliar, in-
experienced, and so on. This argument is nothing more than another 
way of saying there was no discriminatory intent on the part of white 
voters. If such a showing could prove the absence of racially polarized 
voting, then courts would allow the effects of past discrimination to 
perpetuate present-day discriminatory results, thus doubly undermin-
ing congressional intent.164 
To prevent this possibility, Brennan argued that the race of the 
candidate should be irrelevant to a section 2 vote dilution claim. He 
never intended, however, to imply that an African-American candi-
date, for example, would not often be the minority-preferred candidate 
for the African-American community.165 Thus, in Gingles, he did not 
160. See supra notes 149-53 and accompanying text. 
161. See supra notes 90-95 and accompanying text. 
162. Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1988) (emphasizing the 
significance of "elections in which the minority group has sponsored candidates" (emphasis ad-
ded) (quoting Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 57 n.25 (1986))). 
163. See supra notes 29-34, 90, and 110-14 and accompanying text. 
164. Congressional intent would be doubly undermined in that (1) Congress intended § 2 to 
aid minorities in overcoming the effects of past discrimination, see SENATE REPORT, supra note 
15, at 28-29, reprinted at 206; and (2) it intended§ 2 to replace the intent test with a results test, 
see supra notes 97-114 and accompanying text. 
165. Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 68 (1986) (Brennan, J., plurality). 
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consider elections in which there was no African-American candidate. 
The minority sponsorship approach would satisfy Justice Brennan 
because it does not open the door for an intent test. The race of the 
candidate would only be relevant to the extent that it may help courts 
identify the minority-sponsored candidate. Being a minority would 
not alone be enough; evidence that in a certain election the minority 
community sponsored a white candidate in the ways described in sec-
tion III.A would require a court to evaluate that election for racially 
polarized voting as well. The important element under this approach 
is a finding that the white voters vote as a bloc against candidates who 
represent the minority community's interests. 
The minority sponsorship approach satisfies the second and third 
concerns under the irrelevance line of interpretation as well. 166 Those 
who refused to rewrite the language of section 2 by changing "repre-
sentative[ ] of . . . choice" to "minority candidate" can be confident 
that the presence of a minority candidate can often begin, but never 
end, an inquiry as to who is the minority-preferred candidate. The 
sponsorship approach does not require that the candidate herself be a 
minority. 
The Sanchez court stated that to consider "the totality of the cir-
cumstances" as required by section 2, all elections were potentially 
relevant in determining whether or not there has been racial bloc vot-
ing.167 The response to this third concern is that the Sanchez court 
misapplied the "totality" language, in two senses. First, Congress re-
quires that the "totality of the circumstances" be considered in evalu-
ating a vote dilution claim as a whole, not merely in assessing the level 
of racial bloc voting, as the Tenth Circuit implies. 168 Second, a logical 
reading of the language demands that it be interpreted as the totality 
of relevant circumstances. The Sanchez court should not have ignored 
the strong argument that elections which do not offer a minority com-
munity representative are irrelevant to an assessment of racial bloc 
voting. Those elections would, however, be considered as evidence, 
not of the presence or absence of racial bloc voting, but of any of the 
other factors suggested by Congress, perhaps of a "history of official 
discrimination in the state or political subdivision that touched the 
right of . . . the minority group . . . to participate in the democratic 
process."169 Thus, under the minority sponsorship approach, all elec-
tions would be considered in regard to one or another of the suggested 
factors - but not necessarily the racial bloc voting factor, because all 
166. See supra notes 91-92 and accompanying text. 
167. See Sanchez v. Bond, 875 F.2d 1488, 1494-95 (10th Cir. 1989). 
168. Section 2(b) imposes the "totality of circumstances" requirement. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 1973(b) (1988). The Sanchez court implies that this requirement means that every election 
must be considered as to racial bloc voting. Sanchez. 815 F.2d at 1495. 
169. SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 28, reprinted at 206. 
February 1991] Note - Racially Polarized Voting 1065 
elections are not relevant to that factor.170 
Under the minority sponsorship approach, while the race of the 
candidate is not irrelevant - because of its usefulness in quickly iden-
tifying candidates who were probably minority-sponsored - neither is 
it determinative. The following discussion looks at the approach in 
light of the three arguments which originated with those who con-
cluded that the race of the candidate is relevant to the point of being 
determinative.171 
The first remaining argument claims that it seems easier to form an 
accurate, logical account of the minority group's success in electing 
their candidates when only considering elections in which a minority 
ran for office.172 While it may be easier, it is not necessarily more 
accurate. Attempting to speed up the judicial process by using the 
candidate's race as a proxy for minority representation is a meritorious 
goal, but not at the expense of overlooking or misidentifying a minor-
ity-preferred candidate. The proponents of minority civic inclusion 
hope that one result of the enactment of section 2 will be coalition-
building across race.173 As this occurs, more minorities will probably 
be willing to sponsor and vote for whites, and more whites will proba-
bly be willing to sponsor and vote for minorities. Thus, the accuracy 
of such an oversimplified test would decline over time. 
The second remaining argument is a closely related one, offered by 
the Fifth Circuit: that only a minority candidate sponsored by the mi-
nority group can be considered their "chosen representative."174 The 
minority-sponsorship approach is based on this argument to an extent. 
The Fifth Circuit did note that "the court [need not] look at every 
election where there is a millority candidate. If the minority candidate 
... gains little support from any segment of the community, it cannot 
be said that the minority community 'sponsored' the candidate."175 
The Fifth Circuit's argument, however, does not take into account the 
theory of civic inclusion, which informs the minority sponsorship ap-
proach. While the Fifth Circuit's approach maintains that the minor-
ity sponsored representative must be a minority, the approach 
suggested by this Note envisions that as minorities successfully use 
section 2 to counter vote dilution, the probability that minority groups 
will sponsor white candidates will grow. As this occurs, what may be 
socially true today - that only a minority candidate can or will repre-
sent the minority community - may not be true forever. 
The final argument, first offered by Justice White, is that to deem 
170. See supra notes 159-60. 
171. See supra notes 96-95 and accompanying text. 
172. See supra note 93 and accompanying text. 
173. See, e.g., Abrams, supra note 27, at 494-504. 
174. See Campos v. City of Baytown, 840 F.2d 1240, 1245 (5th Cir. 1988). 
175. 840 F.2d at 1245 n.7. 
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. 
the candidate's race irrelevant opens the possibility that findings of 
racially polarized voting might actually be reflections of interest group 
politics as opposed to intentional or unintentional discrimination. 
Under the sponsorship approach, White's illustrative hypothetical in 
Ging/es 176 would no longer be problematic. This approach would 
force a closer look at the amount of support the two African-Ameri-
can Democrats had received from the African-American voters. If, on 
the one hand, the African-American voters had not sponsored the two 
African-American Democratic candidates, but had merely voted for 
all the Democrats because that has been "the most obvious way for 
blacks to assure their community of some voice in the public de-
bate,"177 then there would be no proof of racial bloc voting in that 
election because there would be no minority-sponsored candidate to 
consider. 
On the other hand, suppose the great part of the African-American 
community had sponsored the two African-American Democrats, but 
had not sponsored the African-American Republicans. Justice White 
might argue that what is at play is interest group politics, not discrimi-
nation, if the African-American and white Democrats lose. The mi-
nority sponsorship approach, however, anticipates that, as African-
Americans are gradually integrated throughout society, it should be 
harder and harder to find an interest group that does not include 
them. Where African-Americans in a district continue to vote so co-
hesively, it is an equally plausible explanation that the Republican 
party in the district continues to run on a platform which is not re-
sponsive to the particular needs of a group of people still living today 
with the effects of past discrimination.178 Nonresponsiveness is one of 
the factors which Congress suggested is indicative of a violation of 
section 2. 179 The fact that it corresponds to party lines should not 
deter the courts from a finding of nonresponsiveness.1so 
176. See supra text accompanying notes 37-38. 
177. Guinier, supra note 33, at 393-94. 
178. See SENATE REPORT, supra note 15, at 28-29, reprinted at 206 (Factor 5 illustrates 
congressional recognition of the existence of the continuing effects of past discrimination.) 
179. Senate Report, supra note 15, at 29, reprinted at 207. 
180. The minority sponsorship approach may not long be a matter simply of Democratic 
versus Republican. While African-Americans have long voted loyally Democratic because of a 
perceived lack of responsiveness on the part of the Republican Party, many African-Americans 
are now frustrated and offended by the Democratic Party's new tendency to "distanc[e] itself 
from black interests." Guinier, supra note 33, at 415. In Chicago, this frustration has led to the 
revitalization of the Harold Washington Party, an "all-black alternative slate," which, depending 
on the amount of African-American support it begins to receive, could decrease the likelihood 
that either a Democratic or Republican candidate could claim to be the minority-sponsored can-
didate in upcoming Cook County elections. See Washington Party is Back on Ballot: Officials 
Fear Confusion on Election Day, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26, 1990, § 1, at 1, col. 1 (final ed.); 
Democrats Staggered by High Court Ruling, Chicago Tribune, Oct. 26, 1990, § 1, at 1, col.3 {final 
ed.). 
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CONCLUSION 
Over four years after Thornburg v. Gingles 181 was handed down, 
the case law under section 2 of the Voting Rights Act is still in disar-
ray. While the Court was supposed to have clarified the application of 
section 2 to vote dilution claims, it further confused lower courts by 
introducing controversy over the way to determine the existence of 
racially polarized voting. As the lower courts continue to apply 
widely diverging methods, the Court will be forced, eventually, to re-
solve the dispute it created. The minority sponsorship approach offers 
a resolution that fits neatly with congressional intent for section 2, and 
which looks ahead to the goal of a society which allows minorities to 
participate both in governing and in all phases of being governed. 
- Evelyn Elayne Shockley 
181. 478 U.S. 30 (1986). 
